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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT P. MORRIS, and GUMP &
AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC.,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
Case No. 15660

vs.
JOHN PRICE ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLA&T

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a breach of contract action for recovery of a
real estate commission arising out of the leasing of an office
building by Defendant to IBM Corporation.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury on December 12 and 13, 1977.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs.

The issue

of damages was not submitted to the jury, it being merely a
matter of arithmetic computation for the court to perform.
The court entered judgment on the verdict on December 20,

1977.

Thereafter, post tr1al motions for Judgment NOV or

New Sponsored
Trialby the
were
filed and argued.
Those motions were denied.
S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the Judgment entered below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Robert P. Morris is a real estate saleman who
was employed by Plaintiff Gump and Ayers Real Estate, Inc.
from late 1974 through August of 1975.

(R. pp. 196, 224).

Gump and Ayers Real Estate, Inc. is a real estate broker.
(R. p. 223).
Defendant is engaged in the business of contracting and
developing, and during 1975, also engaged in leasing certain
properties owned by affiliate companies or by its president,
John Price.

(R. pp. 267, 268).

This action arises out of an alleged letter agreement
dated January 29, 1975.

(R. pp. 4, 203).

Due to its

brevity, the letter (Ex. P.-1) is set forth below in its
entirety:

January 29, 1975
Mr. Rob Morris
Gump & Ayers
240 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Re:

Meredian Park Office Building

Dear Rob:
This letter is to assure you that we will cover you on
a 6% commission if a successful lease is negotiated
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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with IBM on the second building of Meredian Park Office
Building.
Regards,
JOHN PRICE ASSOCIATES, INC.

/s/
G. L. Machan
Vice President,
Real Estate
GLM:ef
The Meredian Park office complex referred to in the
letter was originally owned by a limited partnership known
as Meredian Park Associates (R. p. 268).

It was sold to a

third party in the fall of 1976.

Prior to the sale,

(Id.).

in July of 1976, a three year lease was signed between IBM
Corporation and Meredian Park Associates.
P-4).

(R. p. 231; Ex.

It is undisputed that all negotiations concerning

this lease were performed by Defendant; Plaintiffs were not
involved.

( R. pp. 211, 24 7, 310, 312).

The actual negotia-

tions took 8 months and were tedious and complex.

(R. pp.

247, 275).
The factual background adduced in this case indicates
that Mr. Morris had been attempting to lease office space in
Salt Lake City to IBM Corporation for several years, but to
no avail.

(R. pp. 197,198).

As a result of such attempts,

Mr. Morris became acquainted with several employees of IBM,
two of

~hom

were in the real estate department.

(R.

pp.

196,Sponsored
197).
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In the fall of 1974, Mr. Morris became aware that the
second building of the Meredian Park office complex was or
would be available for lease (R. p. 200).

Thereafter, and

prior to the alleged commission letter being procured,
Mr. Morris claims that he showed the building to Mr. Vern
Swenson, then head of IBM's real estate department for the
western

u.s.

(R. p. 215).

However, Mr. Swenson does not

recall being shown the premises at all by Mr. Morris (R. p.
324).
In any event, on or about January 29, 1975, Mr. Morris
telephoned John Price, Defendant's president, concerning
the property.

(R. p. 201).

The evidence concerning the

substance of that conversation is conflicting, but Mr.
Morris claims he told Mr. Price of his contacts with IBM and
that IBM was interested in leasing the second building of
Meredian Park.

(R. p. 201, 202).

Mr. Morris also claims

that Mr. Price directed him to stop by Defendant's offices
and pick up a commission letter and a set of plans from Mr.
Machan, Defendant's vice president.

(Id.)

Mr. Price denies

authorizing the letter, claims it was procured by misrepresentation, and generally disagrees with the way things happened.
(R. PP· 269-272).

Nevertheless, Mr. Morris stopped by the

offices of Defendant on or about January 29, 1975, and
obtained the alleged commission Letter and a set of ?lans to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

the building.

(R. p. 203).

He also obtained a cover letter

for the plans, which he signed.

( R. p. 204; Ex. P-2).

cover letter was written on Defendant's stationery.
P-2).

The

(Ex.

Defendant did not authorize Mr. Morris to write the

letter on its stationery and Mr. Morris does not claim he
was so authorized.

(R.

pp. 242, 246).

Mr. Morris testified that on or about January 29,
1975, he delivered to Mr. Vern Swenson of IBM in Los Angeles

the cover letter and a set of plans to the second building
of the Meredian Park office complex.

( R• p • 205 ) •

Mo r r i s

stated that he discussed the project over lunch with Mr.
Swenson on that day.

(R.

p. 206).

,Morris further testified

that he met with Mr. Swenson three to five weeks later in
Salt Lake City and discussed the project briefly.
~r.

( Id.)

Morris recalled no further contact with Mr. Swenson or

anyone from the real estate department of IBM.

(R.

p. 207).

He did, however, state that he remained in contact with Mr.
Chuck Woodward,

local IBM typewriter salesman, through the

fall of 1975 respecting the Meredian Park project.

(Id.)

Mr. Morris admitted that he was not involved in the
negotiation of the lease with IBM; that he did not know the
terms of the lease, and; that he had no business contact
whatsoever with Mr. Ray Zimmerman, the authorized IBM
employee wno commenced and ult1mately consummated tne lease
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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negotiations with Defendant.

(R. pp. 211, 310, 311).

The evidence in the record is uncontroverted that
Mr. Ray Zimmerman was the only employee of IBM who was
authorized to negotiate a lease for space in the Salt Lake
City area during the time period in question.
309, 329-330, 346-347).

(R. pp. 305-

The only contact between Morris and

Mr. Zimmerman was a brief conversation consisting entirely of
"pleasantries.•

(R. p. 310).

Mr. Zimmerman does recall

seeing one letter from Morris to Vern Swenson in the IBM
files which was footnoted by Mr. John Lind, another IBM
employee.

(R. pp. 312, 349).

There was no testimony, how-

ever, from Mr. Zimmerman or any other person as to when he
first saw that letter, whether or not he took any action as
a result of seeing the letter or whether he had even read
it.

There is no testimony in the record from Mr. Zimmerman

or anyone else as to whether he even saw a set of plans on
the project priot to the time when he began negot1ations
with Defendant in late 1975.
Mr. Vern Swenson of IBM recalled that he had lunch
with Mr. Morris in late January of 1975 in Los Angeles.
PP· 321, 322).

(R.

He did not recall whether the Meridian Park

office building was discussed or whether Morris left a
letter and plans with him.

(Id.)

However, he d1d state

that other projects were discussed at tnat ti~e.
325).

tR. p.

He recalls seeing ~orris sometime later 1n Salt ~ake
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City, but does not recall discussing Meredian Park.

( Id.)

Mr. Swenson was not involved in the lease negotiations
between defendant and IBM.

(R. p. 332).

Further, he

testified that local people, such as Mr. Chuck Woodward had
no authority to act on behalf of IBM with respect to the
acquisition of leased space or other real estate activities.
(R. p. 329).
During the period of January 1975 through September of
1975 Mr. John Lind of IBM was the IBM employee charged with
the

cond~ct

346, 355).

of its real estate operations in Utah.

(R. pp.

He testified unequivocally that during said

period of time

~ ~

at IBM had any authority to negotiate

for additional leased space 1n Salt Lake City, and furthermore,
no decision had been made by IBM as to whether it even
needed any additional space.

(R. pp. 356, 358, 323, 306).

At no time did Mr. Lind have any contact with Mr. Morris
relative to the Meredian Park office complex.

(R. p. 359).

There was no contact whatsoever between Plaintiffs and
Defendant between January 29, 1975, and March 12, 1976--after
the basic deal had been negotiated with IBM.

Morris was

unaware of any specific requirements IBM may have had
and he did not know of any specif1cs relative to the project
such as:

actual available square footage, rent charge,

ava1:able

~er~,

"flt-up" prov1s1ons, parKlng or ownership
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of the property.

(R. pp. 211, 212, 278-280).

Moreover, he

never made any attempt whatsoever to acqua1nt himself with
these factors.

(R. pp. 278-280).

Morris had no contact

whatsoever with any of the lease negotiations and he had no
idea whether they were progressing along or whether they had
even begun.

(R. pp. 211, 212).

Morris made no effort to

follow-up on his initial contacts with Mr. Swenson or with
any of the other IBM real estate personnel.

(R. p. 295).

Morris made no formal introduction of the two authorized
principals involved and he had no knowledge of the lease
terms to which each could agree.

(R. pp. 278-280, 247).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ADDUCE ANY EVIDENCE
WHATSOEVER TO PROVE THAT THEY WERE THE
"PROCURING CAUSE" OF THE LEASE WITH IBM.
Under Utah law, which follows the general rule regarding
brokerage agreements, in order for a broker to recover a
commission his efforts must have been the procuring cause
which resulted in the closing of the transaction upon which
his claim is predicated.

In this case, it is essential for

Plaintiffs to prove that they were the procuring cause ot
the lease with IBM since such performance is the only conslderation to support the contract they seek to enforce.
In Brooks v. George Q. Cannon Assn., 178 Pac. 539
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(Utah, 1919), the court considered a case very similar to the
one at bar.

Plaintiff Brooks had entered into an agreement

with defendant to obtain a loan for defendant.

Concurrently,

one of defendant's directors was also seeking lenders to make
the same loan to defendant.

The evidence showed that prior to

any loan being obtained by defendant, plaintiff and one LaBlonde
had written to the Travelers Insurance Co. regarding a loan
to defendant and had received a favorable reply to their
letter.

There was no significant follow-up to this letter, but

later a loan was negotiated directly between defendant and
Travelers.

Plaintiff then claimed a commission on the loan.

The case was tried to a jury and a judgment rendered for
plaintiff.

The Supreme Court reversed, finding no evidence to

prove that plaintiff was the procuring cause of the loan.

Of

principal importance to the court's decision were facts to the
effect that:

(1) months had gone by between plaintiff's

contact with Travelers and the date of closing; (2) the persons
contacted by plaintiff at Travelers were not authorized to make
the loan, and;

(3) plaintiff had no part in negotiating the loan

nor in supplying the necessary data and information whereby it
was finally consummated.

178 Pac. at 591.

In its ruling,

the court stated the law as follows:
It 1s elementary in this class of cases that in
order for a croker to recover comm1ss1ons his
efforts must nave oeen tne procuring cause wh1ch
resulted in the closing of the transaction upon
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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which his claim is predicated. The rule is
variously stated in the decisions of the courts
and by the textwriters, but all are agreed that
the efforts of the broker, in order to entitle
him to a commission, must have been the efficient procuring or producing cause of the transaction relied upon by him. Id.
May other courts have reached the same conclusion as
the Utah court using similar rationale.

In Hampton Park Corp.

v. T. D. Burgess Co., Inc., 270 Md. 269, 311 A.2d 35 (1973),
the Maryland Supreme Court reversed a trial court ruling in
favor of plaintiff and held, inter alia, that for a broker to
earn his commission "the negotiations conducted by the broker
must have progressed to a point where success seems imminent
and, it is not sufficient that the broker merely planted
the seed from which the harvest was reaped."

311 A.2d at 423.

A key factor in the ruling of the Maryland court in this
case was that much of plaintiff's effort was directed toward
employees of the eventual purchaser who had not been authorized
to conduct the actual negotiations.

Id.

To the same effect

see Walker v. David Davies, Inc., 34 Ohio App.2d 139, 296
N.E.2d 691, 693 (1973), where the appeals court overruled
a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on the grounds that
plaintiffs' efforts were not the procuring cause of the sale
because they were directed primarily toward a person who had
no direct dealings in the final negotiation of tne sale.
Another case in point in Link v. PatricK, 367 P.2d

~s;

(Alaska, 1961), wherein the Alaska Supreme Court reversed a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lower court judgment for plaintiff-broker because plaintiff
had failed to meet his burden of proving that he was the
procuring cause of the sale.

The court there noted that, at

best, plaintiff had presented evidence from which it could
be "inferred" that plaintiff could have been the procuring
cause--such inference the court concluded did not meet the
burden of proof.

Id. at 158.

The Utah court is in full agreement with the evidentiary
position of the Link case, supra.

In Sumsion v. Streator-Smith,

Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 (1943), Justice Wolfe, in this
oft-cited case, held that:
While deductions may be based on probabilities,
the evidence must do more than merely raise a
conjecture or show a probability. Where there are
probabilities the other way equally or more potent
the deductions are mere guesses and the jury
should not be permitted to speculate . • . The
evidence must, however, do more than merely raise
a conjecture or show a probability as to the cause
of the injury, and no recovery can be had if the
evidence leaves to conjecture which of two probable
causes resulted in the injury, where defendant was
liable for only one of them. 132 P.2d at 683.
See also, Olsen v. Warwood, 255 P.2d 725 (Utah, 1953); Bolt v.
Davis, 70 N.M. 449, 374 P.2d 648 (1962).
From the foregoing case law, in order for Plaintiffs to
sustain their burden on the issue of procuring cause they must
show that:
(l)

not only planted the seed which d1rectly
tne narvest, out that they were
involved in the transaction to a ?Oint where
success seemed imm1nent;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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{ 2)

Their dealings were with persons authorized
to consummate the transaction;

{3)

The time lapse between their efforts and
the closing was not unreasonably attenuated,
and;

{4)

The transaction in fact resulted from their
efforts--not jus~that it might have.

When the above criteria are applied to the facts of
the instant case, Plaintiffs fail on each and every point.
At best it might be said that Plaintiffs could possibly
have planted a seed--their involvement ended there.

At the

time of their dealings with IBM success was at least a year
away and IBM was neither interested in leasing nor authorized
to do so.

Plaintiffs had no business dealings whatsoever with

any persons at IBM who were authorized to negotiate the lease.
The time lapse between Plaintiffs' efforts and the closing was
18 months, during which time Mr. Morris' only contact was with

Mr. Woodward, the local typewriter man.

During this extended

period Morris did nothing whatever to follow-up.

Finally the

evidence shows that the procuring cause of the lease could have
been a number of different things.
of a mailing by Defendant.

It could have been a result

{R. p. 273).

It

could have

been a result of the independent efforts of Mr. Zimmerman.
p. 308).
Defendant.

(R.

It could have been as a result of a later contact by
{R. p. 274).

The evidence is equally suscepdble

to inferences supporting any of the foregoing "procur1ng
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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causes," any of which after the 18-month lapse is more probable
than the one the Plaintiffs claim.

In addition, by delivering

the plans with a cover letter on Defendant's stationery, Mr.
Morris attempted to convey the impression that he was an
employee of Defendant, thereby voluntarily removing himself
from any further contact or involvement.
In the final analysis the fact remains that Plaintiffs
produced no affirmative evidence to prove that they were the
procuring cause of the lease with IBM.

A contrary finding is

simply unsupported by any substantial, credible and legally
sufficient evidence.
POINT II
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 GIVEN BY THE COURT IMPROPERLY STATES THE LAW OF "PROCURING CAUSE" AND
IS CLEARLY PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT.
Instruction No. 11 given by the court in this case reads
as follows:
To recover, plaintiffs must show by a preponderance that they were the procuring cause of
the lease between IBM and defendant. To be the
procuring cause of the lease, plaintiffs must have
set a chain of events in motion that finally
resulted in the lease.
If the events caused by
the plaintiffs' acts came to nothing, and the
lease was entered because of completely new and
independent causes, then plaintiffs cannot recover.
However, this does not mean that plaintiffs must
have participated at every step of negotiations or
even in most of them. Nor does it mean that
plaintiffs were not the procuring cause if others
would have set the same chain of events 1n motion
had elaintlffs not dcne so.
(Empnasis added.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This instruction conveys the clear impression that to
be the procuring cause in this transaction all Plaintiffs had
to do was start the ball rolling--no matter if someone else had
to push it to its destination.

This is not what procuring

cause means.
In Reed v. Taylor, 322 P.2d 147 (Wyo., 1958), the
Wyoming court had occasion to interpret and analyze the
definition of procuring cause as set forth in the Utah case
of Brooks v. George Q. Cannon Assn., supra, and others.
The Wyoming court held that where more than one party is
seeking to procure a sale or lease for a seller (as is the
case here) the sale must arise from the foundation laid by
the broker in order to entitle him to a commission.

The

court there stated that:
The mere introduction of a prospect to an owner
or even the broker's participation is unsuccessful negotiations between the parties does not
earn the broker a commission .
In such
a case the introduction of a prospect is merely
one step in providing the foundation from
which the broker may develop a sale. 322 P.2d
at 150.
The court went on to further indicate that tne key test is that
the procuring broker is the one who causes a meet1ng of the
minds between the principals.

l£. at

150.

See 3lso Hampton

Park Corp. v. T. D. Burgess Co., Inc., ~·
The case law on procuring cause clearly requ1res something more than merely setting a chain of events in mot1on.
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It requires that the broker's efforts cause minds to meet,
for success to be imminent and that the chain of events move
continually forward as a direct result of the broker's efforts.

Such is not the case here.

Instruction No. 11 given by the court led the jury to
the conclusion that all Plaintiffs had to do was introduce
the parties and the commission was earned.

That is not the

law and the jury was improperly instructed.
The requirement that Plaintiffs be the procuring cause
of the lease is the only consideration to support the contract alleged by them.

Given the substantial nature of the

commission claimed, in this case
cause requires effort.

~nd

others, to be a procuring

The broker must cause a meeting of

the minds, success must be imminent, he must be dealing with
authorized people and he must do this all within a reasonable
period of time.

Here, the efforts of Plaintiffs do not amount

to a peppercorn because there is no causal relationship between what they did and the lease which was finally negotiated.
POINT III
ROBERT P. MORRIS IS AN IMPROPER PARTY TO
THIS ACTION.
On March 17, 1977, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment in
~s

t~1s

action seeking to have the action dismissed

to Pla1nt1ff Rotert P. Morr1s.

(R.

p.

29).

The grounds

for sucn mot1on were set forth in the supporting memorandum
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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filed therewith.

(R. pp. 31, 32).

by the lower court.

(R. p. 34).

Said motion was denied
Denial of said motion

was improper and constitutes error in this case.
Robert P. Morris is a real estate salesman, who was employed by Plaintiff Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc., a real
estate broker.

It has been established by request for

admission that Robert P. Morris is not now nor has he ever
been a real estate broker licensed under the laws of Utah.
(R. p. 23).

Utah Code Annotated§ 61-2-18 (1953) provides as follows:
(a) No person, partnership, association or corporation shall bring or maintain an action in any
court of this state for the recovery of commission, a fee or compensation for any act done or
service rendered, the doing or rendering of which
is prohibited under the provisions of this act
to other than licensed real estate brokers, unless such person was duly licensed hereunder
as a real estate broker at the time of the doing
of such act or the rendering of such service.
(b) No real estate salesman shall have the right
to institute suit in his own name for the recovery of a fee, commission or compensat1on for
services as real estate salesman except where
the action is against the broker but any such
action shall be instituted and brought by the
broker with whom the salesman is connected.
Section 61-2-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953), defines the
leasing of real property as being an act which must be performed by a licensed real estate broker in order to be legal.
It has been admitted in this case that Robert P. Morris 1s
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not a licensed real estate broker.

Accordingly, Robert P.

Morris is not a proper party to the instant lawsuit.

The

statute in question (§61-2-18) speaks in no uncertain terms:
it provides that a real estate salesman shall not directly
bring an action for collection of a commission.

Defendant

submits in view of this statute and the admitted facts in
this lawsuit, the lower court erred in failing to grant the
Summary Judgment requested.
Such error is particularly prejudicial to Defendant because Mr. Morris terminated

hi~

employment with Gump & Ayers

Real Estate, Inc., (the broker), prior to the time the lease
was consummated with IBM.

(R. p. 224).

Thus, absent some

evidence of assignment of the contract rights either to
another broker or from Morris back to Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc., the record does not disclose who owns the claim.
There is no evidence of an assignment in this case, consequently it may well be that whoever owns the claim has no right to
bring suit on it.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs failed to prove that they were the procuring cause of the lease with IBM.

At best, Plaintiffs' evi-

dence required the Jury to engage in rank speculation to
reach its verdict.

Furthermore, the jury was hastened to

lts insupportaole verd1ct

~y

Instr~ction

parts the d1stinct 1mpression that a

~ere

No. 11 which im1ntroduction of
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the parties is sufficient consideration to support the
contract and satisfy the requirement of procuring cause.
Finally, Robert P. Morris is an improper party to this
action.
The Judgment of the lower court should be reversed.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Inc.
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